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THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF COMPUTER
RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS (CRS's)
DEREK SAUNDERS
THE PASSAGE of the Airline Deregulation Act' dramat-
ically altered the airline industry. Market forces, rather
than government agencies, 2 began to regulate the indus-
try. The transition, however, has not been an easy one.
Procedures and relationships well suited to a regulated in-
dustry are now viewed as outdated, onerous, and even
anticompetitive.
The current conflict over carrier-owned computer res-
ervation systems (CRS's) represents one instance of these
problems.3 The air transportation distribution system re-
lies heavily on the use of CRS's, particularly since deregu-
lation and the resulting increase in airline activity. 4 One
I Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (Supp.
1984)).
2 Competitive Market Investigation, CAB Docket 36,595 (Dec. 16, 1982) at 3.
For a discussion of deregulation in general and antitrust problems specifically, see
Beane, The Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1001
(1980).
1 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644 (1984). The text only discusses, as did the CAB,
problems with CRS's owned by individual carriers. There is at this time one sys-
tem, Tymshare's Mars Plus, that is not owned by an airline. Id. at 11,667. Despite
suggestions that any rule apply to third-party as well as carrier-owned systems, the
CAB noted numerous reasons for not including Mars Plus in its CRS rulemaking.
Because of Tymshare's low market share and different system structure, the po-
tential for abuse was not present. The significant aspect of a non-carrier's posi-
tion is that, unlike an airline owner, there is no incentive to impede airline
transportation competition because the CRS revenues are generated from a dif-
ferent source. Also, the CAB felt that the non-airline CRS's did not have the ca-
pacity to engage in the type of conduct complained of and which its rule sought to
prohibit. Id. at 11,645.
4Id.
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study estimates that eighty percent of all travel agents use
CRS's.5 These agents account for forty to ninety percent
of most airlines' ticket sales.6 Consequently, CRS owners,
through their respective CRS's, enjoy substantial control
and access to the preferred means of airline transporta-
tion distribution.
As the influence of CRS's began to increase, non-own-
ing carriers and travel agents complained to both the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) and Congress. 7 Congress re-
sponded by authorizing the CAB to conduct an investiga-
tion into the competitive effects and antitrust implications
of CRS's.8 The CAB study eventually resulted in a
rulemaking9 and finally the enactment of a rule in July of
1984.10 Rather than end the controversy, the new rules
seem merely to mark the end of the first battle. Though
the rule has only recently become effective, non-owning
carriers have already pushed for its amendment, in addi-
tion to exploring other means to attack the power of CRS
owners.
I. CRS DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
Travel agents use CRS's to make flight reservations for
Review of Airline Deregulation and Sunset of the Civil Aeronautics Board: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1983) (CAB report to Congress on airline computer
reservation systems, citing a study by Lou Harris of Travel Weekly magazine) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings]. The information in the study was compiled by surveying
travel agents and was published in May of 1982. Id. at 38.
r, Id. at 41. The CAB report asserted that if anything, the percentage of ticket
sales attributable to automated travel agents (agents with CRS's) would rise in the
future. Id.
7 Id. at 32. The carriers complained that the CRS market structure and market
entry conditions were such that CRS owners could manipulate air transportation
sales. Id.
1 128 Cong. Rec. H9515 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1982) (conference report accompa-
nying Pub. L. 97-369). The authorization was attached to a House appropriations
bill for transportation agencies. The House included the Department ofJustice in
the investigation, and asked that the CAB study be made in conjunction with the
Department of Transportation. Id.
9 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644 (1984).
, 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540 (1984).
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the consumer. 1' A CRS basically involves the use of a
computer terminal whereby schedules, fares, and seat
availability information are displayed for the travel agent
who, in turn, advises the customer.' 2 This information
appears to the agent on a series of screens shown in suc-
cession until the appropriate information is found. 13 The
different screens of information are fed to the agent's ter-
minal from the respective host airline's reservation
database.' 4 The factual information for the computer
databases of host airlines' 5 comes from three sources.
The Official Airline Guide (OAG) gathers the flight sched-
ule information for all airlines and compiles a computer
tape of the schedules on a weekly basis. 16 Second, the
Airline Tariff Publishing Company (ATP) collects all of
the airlines' fare information.' 7 The third source consists
,, Id. Travel agents can also issue tickets, make hotel and rental car reserva-
tions, and even keep office accounts on a CRS. Id. at 32,548.
12 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,648. Prior to the advent of CRS's, the making of flight
reservations was a tedious and time-consuming process. The OAG published a
large and unwieldly manual containing flight schedules and some fare informa-
tion. For the complete fare and tariff information, however, the agent would have
to consult the individual carrier's publications. The actual reservations would be
made by telephone and the ticket written by hand by the agent. Obviously, ar-
ranging a simple trip would require the consultation of a number of different
sources. In addition, the agent would have no idea of availability until he called
the airlines. The inefficiencies of the system led to the development of inhouse
systems and subsequent attempts between 1967 and 1976 to establish industry-
wide CRS's. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text, which discusses the
operation of a CRS.
United Airlines was the first to develop a CRS. 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,648. Ameri-
can Airlines soon followed with its SABRE system. Other systems include TWA's
PARS system, Delta's DATAS II, Eastern's SODA, and Tymshare's MARS PLUS
(the only major system not owned by a carrier). Id. at 11,649. For more detailed
information concerning the unique features of each system, see Hearings, supra
note 5, at 52-65, where the CAB's report is included. In 1976 United Airlines
introduced the first CRS, APOLLO, and began to offer the service to travel
agents.
1., 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,648.
14 Id. The database is part of the airlines' inhouse system by which it directly
books its own flights. Id.
' The term "host airline" refers to a CRS owner. The terms are used inter-
changeably in all sources and are used in the same fashion here.
- 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,648. The schedules are only for direct flights. Connec-
tions are made by the CRS owners for non-direct flights. Id. at 11,648-49.
17 Hearings, supra note 5, at 45. Fares are updated on a daily basis and are
shown along with any conditions accompanying the fares. Id.
160 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
of the in-house computers of all airlines and provides the
data on seat availability.' The in-house computers com-
municate with the host airline's database by way of a radio
communications system.' 9 All the data is consolidated by
the host airline and readied for transmission. In addition,
there are numerous variations and optional services which
a CRS can offer to an agent.20 In sum, a CRS consists of a
central database, periodically updated, which feeds to and
is accessed by the numerous terminals of the subscribing
agents.
In addition to information sources, it is important to
understand the display format as shown on the CRS ter-
minal. There are several formats from which the agent
can chose. 2 ' The agent may request all the schedules for a
particular city-to-city flight route, called a city-pair mar-
ket, 2 that fit the requested departure time.23 Another
type of format may include, along with flight information,
seat availability information in reference to the type of
fare requested. 24 Of course, as more information is pro-
vided for each flight, a greater number of lines are used to
display each flight, and the number of screens needed to
view all applicable flight information increases.2 5 Agents
18 Id.
19 The system is operated by Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC). Id. The main
problem with ARINC is that, due to the huge volume of messages sent by the
various airlines, much information is mistransferred or delayed, causing major air-
lines to establish direct computer to computer lines. Id.
20 Id. In addition there are three different types of CRS's; direct access, multi-
ple access, and proprietary access. Direct access allows an agent to communicate
with the computer of a host airlines as well as the computers of other participating
carriers. Multiple access allows an agent to have direct access using a switch but
normally allows only direct communication with the principle carrier. Other op-
tions offered by CRS's include accounting packages, automatic pricing, complete
rules displays, and advance boarding pass capabilities. 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,650.
21 Hearings, supra note 5, at 45.
22 Id. A "city-pair market" is the market for sales for a route between two spe-
cific cities; i.e., Dallas to New York, Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. Other data shown may include the type of aircraft, connecting cities, and
travel messages ranging from airport congestion reports to promotional
messages. Id.
2 . Id. at 46. There is a natural tendency for agents to book flights from the
earliest screen with a suitable flight. Id. at 67. Consequently, the opportunities
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are naturally inclined to book the first suitable flight.26
Once a suitable flight has been located, the agent will
request a reservation through the CRS. 27 If the flight be-
longs to the CRS owner, the "host," then the reservation
is immediately recorded and a ticket can be issued.28
Should the flight be on a "non-host" carrier, however, the
reservation must be relayed.29 Some systems circumvent
this problem with direct access to certain non-host carri-
ers' in-house systems.3 0 The consensus among agents is
that the more direct the access to the internal system of
the particular carrier, the more reliable the information.3 '
Reliability is an important factor in an agent's decision be-
tween alternative bookings. 2
CRS's are available to agents through leasing agree-
ments, though it is also possible for the agency to
purchase the equipment.3 3 Lease costs vary with the type
of system used, the number of terminals leased, and the
number of locations involved in the lease.34 Lease costs
are often affected by competition. In certain markets,
CRS owners compete vigorously for agent subscriptions,
sometimes to the point of leasing below direct costs.
3 5
Lease periods are relatively long, ranging from four to ten
for a given carrier to receive an agent's booking depends a great deal upon the
structure and format choices made available by a CRS owner. Id.
26 Id. at 46.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
so See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
.1 Hearings, supra note 5, at 46.
2 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,652. Reliable information is important because of a prob-
lem in the industry called the "no rec" problem. Often an agent will book a flight
on a carrier to which he has no direct access, only to find that because of system
malfunction the reservation was never confirmed. Unfortunately the "no rec"
problem may not be discovered until the customer attempts to board the plane.
Id. System malfunction occurs when the CRS tries to send the reservation
through the ARINC network. See supra note 19.
3 Hearings, supra note 5, at 78.
34 Id. at 78, 79.
3- Id. at 79. Carrier-owned CRS's are able to do this because of the huge profits
derived from incremental revenues. See infra notes 127 - 135, 162-163 and accom-
panying text.
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years with the trend being towards longer leases.36 The
leases often include provisions restricting an agent's abil-
ity to subscribe to more than one system.
Non-host carriers as well as travel agents must gain ac-
cess to a system. Originally, non-host carriers could be-
come "co-hosts" by paying small booking fees, in addition
to a contribution to capital and a promise to help market
the system in areas where the non-hosts had large market
shares 8.3  Later, these co-hosts were charged for each seg-
ment 39 at an agreed charge. 0 Co-hosts usually enjoyed
preferential screen placement. 4 ' Recently American and
United, the two largest CRS owners, significantly in-
creased their booking fees, though charging relatively
lower fees to high volume carriers.42 The participation of
high volume carriers in a system is crucial to its
marketability.43
Another recent development is the use of "net ticketing
arrangements. 4 4 Carriers often write tickets, either in-
house or through agents, under their name but for trans-
portation by another carrier.4 5 Originally this service was
performed free of charge, but net ticketing arrangements
require that when the CRS host writes more tickets for
36 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,65 1. SABRE leases are generally four to five years while
APOLLO leases range from seven to ten years. Id.
-47 Id. The restrictions for United include a rule that requires APOLLO sub-
scribers to book at least ninety-five percent of their bookings through APOLLO.
Id. American achieves the same effect by requiring the agencies to have at least as
many SABRE terminals as other CRS terminals. Id. at 11,652. The Department
of Justice found that only 12.6% of all automated agencies had more than one
type of CRS at a given location. Id.
Id. at 11,651.
' A segment is basically a flight between two airports. A fee is charged for each
flight reservation made between two stops. Thus a trip reservation made between
two connecting flights would be charged the price of two times the segment fee,
usually two to three dollars. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 82.
40 Id.
1, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,651.
42 Hearings, supra note 5, at 82.
43 Id. CRS owners must include these high volume carriers to enhance the at-
tractiveness of their product for potential travel agency subscribers. High volume
co-hosts have used their market position to negotiate the lower fees. Id.
44 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,651.
4 Hearings, supra note 5, at 85-88.
another carrier than that carrier writes for the CRS host,
the ticketing carrier is required to pay the CRS host a sub-
stantial per-ticket fee for the excess number.16 CRS hosts
were able to arrange these agreements by threatening the
carriers with the denial of CRS access. 4 7 In sum, CRS
hosts predominantly dictate the access terms for partici-
pating carriers.
CRS's are basically automated versions of the old fare
books and flight schedules. They are high-tech tools for
the travel agent and reservation desks for the airlines.
CRS's have filled their role so successfully that they have
had a major impact on the way airlines and air travelers do
business.
II. CRS's IN THE AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
CRS's perform a vital function in the air transporation
industry. This function cannot be appreciated without
understanding two aspects of the airline industry. One
aspect is the essential nature of CRS's for the travel agent.
The second is the crucial role of the travel agent in airline
ticket sales.
Modern travel agencies demand the use of CRS's be-
cause airline ticketing without CRS's is slow and ineffi-
cient."8 Today, with deregulation dramatically increasing
the number of carriers, flights, fares, and restrictions, the
old method is barely a useful supplement to a CRS and
certainly not a substitute."9 Agents can make a reserva-
tion using a CRS in one-third the time it took before.5 °
An independent study found that CRS use creates a forty-
two percent productivity gain for agents over the previous
method. 51 Agents and carriers agree that in the present
air transportation distribution system, the use of a CRS
- Id. The fees may be as high as three dollars per ticket. Id. at 87.
47 Id. at 86.
- See supra notes 31 - 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the previ-
ous method of ticketing.
41, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,648.
51 Hearings, supra note 5, at 37.
1 Id. at 38.
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has become essential.52
The importance of CRS's is only magnified by the ever
expanding role of travel agents in air transportation dis-
tribution. Travel agents are responsible for approxi-
mately fifty-four percent of domestic airline revenues and
eighty percent of foreign airline revenues. 5' Travel
agents are uniquely able to arrange consumer travel.5 a
The consumer's other option has been direct sales from
the airline. In recent years, however, the percentage of
sales attributable to each type of distribution system has
changed dramatically. Travel agents have increased their
share from thirty-eight percent of domestic airline ticket
sales in 1977, to fifty-three percent in 1979, and to about
sixty-five percent in 1982. 55
There are three reasons for the shift in sales. First, the
number of fares, schedules, and restrictions have in-
creased geometrically since the advent of deregulation.5 6
Only by using a travel agency may a consumer, in one
step, determine the best flight and purchase a ticket. Sec-
ond, travel agents provide other needed services for the
consumer. Travel agents can sell other forms of transpor-
tation, make rental car reservations, hotel reservations,
design complete travel packages, make arrangements for
passports and visas, issue travelers checks and travelers
insurance, and even sell tours and charters.57 Consumers
- 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,649. This statement is based in part on the statements of
American Airlines on the importance of CRS's. Id.
5-1 Competitive Marketing Investigation, CAB Order 82-12-85, Dec. 16, 1982. The
investigation was initiated as part of the CAB's reevaluation of its regulatory
stance in the wake of the Airline Deregulation Act. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat.
1705 (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (Supp. 1984)). The CAB found that travel
agent members of the Air Traffic Transport Association (ATC) and International
Air Transport Association (IATA), as well as those organizations, should no
longer receive antitrust immunity in a post-deregulation era. Competition Marketing
Investigation, at 4. The CAB ruling may be reversed by congressional action, but
this issue is intimately connected with the CRS issue. Should the CAB's decision
stand, it may have negative ramifications for the validity of its arguments in its
CRS ruling. Id. at 4.
54 Competitive Marketing Investigation, supra note 53, at 8.
5 Id. at 19.
',- Id.
-7 Id. at 17.
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are said to "view travel agents as providers of objective
travel advice."'5' Third, travel agents are almost the ex-
clusive source of interline tickets for the consumer. 9 A
consumer forced to utilize two or more airlines to reach
his destination has little choice but to consult an agency.
The complexity of today's airline transportation offerings
has led to this dependence.
In sum, CRS's have become as important to the airline
industry as the telephone is to American business. The
majority of airline flight reservations are booked using
CRS's. Unlike the telephone, however, CRS's, are con-
trolled by competitors of the airlines forced to use them.
It is the airline's ownership of CRS's that raises antitrust
questions.
III. ANTITRUST PROBLEMS WITH THE CRS INDUSTRY
The practices of the CRS industry raise the question
whether existing conditions are the result of violations of
antitrust law rather than competitive forces. To answer
this the industry must be evaluated under existing anti-
trust case law and commentary. First, however, a brief
overview of applicable law may prove helpful.
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act makes it unlaw-
ful to monopolize or attempt to monopolize. 60 A firm vio-
lates Section 2 if it possesses monopoly power and in
some way uses or maintains that power to the detriment
of free competition. Thus there are two elements of a vio-
lation, a finding of monopoly power, and a showing of de-
liberateness on the part of the monopoly.6 Monopoly
power is the power to control prices or exclude competi-
-1 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,697.
51 Competitive Marketing Investigation, supra note 53, at 5.
.... 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1980). "Every person who shall monopolize, or attemp- to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monol.
olize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be
deemed guilty of a felony .... ." Id.
- L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 29 (1977).
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tion from the relevant market.62 The courts are divided as
to what is required to establish deliberateness.63 Because
intent can be inferred from a defendant's actions, how-
ever, this second element is relatively easy to prove.64
A. Monopoly Power
The analysis most consistently followed in determining
monopoly power is the structural analyisis which Judge
Learned Hand developed in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (ALCOA). 65 The analysis consists of two parts.
First, the market in which the monopoly exists must be
defined.6 6 This involves defining both the product market
and the geographic market. 6' The second part of the AL-
COA analysis uses the market definitions and looks at the
magnitude of a firm's power in the market. 68 The major
indicant relied upon in making this determination is mar-
ket concentration. 69 Often, however, concentration is not
conclusive. In these situations the courts will look to
other factors which effect the extent to which concentra-
tion percentages represent market power.7v Other factors
relied upon include entry barriers, 71 industry structure,72
62 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966), citing United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 777 (1956).
' ,I See generally, 16B J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, ANTITRUST
LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 8.02[4] (1984). Intent is often inferred by the
courts, the requirement being a finding of a general rather than specific intent to
monopolize. Id. at § 8.02[4] n.n. 49-102. The minimum intent that must be
shown is that the defendant's conduct and practices were aimed at maintaining its
monopoly power. Id. at n. 101.
" See supra note 63.
" 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See also SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at 40, n.2,
listing major cases in which Judge Hand's approach was followed.
I SULLIVAN, supra note 61, § 11.
67 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 63, at § 8.01[2] n.19.
' SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at § 11.
VON KAWINOWSKI, supra note 63, at § 8.02[3][b], nn. 66-67 (citing United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948)). See generally VON KAWINOWSKI, supra note
63, at § 8.02[3][b] for a discussion of the holdings of various courts with regards
to market concentration.
70 SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at 77.
7, Id. citing United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), affd per curiam 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
72 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 63, at § 8.02[3][c](i).
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pricing conduct,73 profits, 74 and other types of perform-
ance analysis.75 In this way a court determines the extent
of a firm's monopoly power.
Market Definition and Concentration
The product market is the area of goods in which the
monopoly's product competes. 76 The definition necessar-
ily includes those products considered to be substitutes.77
The relevant product market for the CRS industry has
been called the "air transportation computer reservation
services" market. 78 The CRS owners sell an information
distribution system, and the two-way distribution of infor-
mation between travel agents and airlines constitutes the
market's transactions. 79 For the travel agent, the produc-
tivity and efficiency provided by a CRS are essential. The
previous distribution system, the only other option, is in
no way a substitute given the assumption that most agents
will wish to maintain their present volume. Thus CRS's
compete solely with multiple-access, two-way, computer
systems providing both information and ticketing capabil-
ities. This is the relevant product market.
73 SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at §§ 28-29.
74 Id. at § 27.
75 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 63, at § 8.02[3](c)(ii); SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at
§§ 26-32.
76 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); VON
KALINOWSKI, supra note 63, at § 8.02[2]nn. 20-21.
77 VON KAWLINOSKI, supra note 63, at § 8.02(2)(a). There are two optional tests;
reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand. The former
looks to the purposes and physical characteristics of the different products. If two
products are the same in the important characteristics and can perform the same
basic functions, then they can be regarded as substitutes. The second test exam-
ines the relationship of the products' price to consumer preference. Basically, if
an increase in the price of one product will cause consumers to purchase a second
product instead, then there is cross-elasticity of demand and the products are sub-
stitutes. The degree to which either test is satisfied will be the deciding factor in
finding two products to be substitutes. Id.
7, Cohen, The Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 28 ANTITRUST BULL.
131, 152 (1982).
7, 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,544. In the CAB rulemaking, American and United ar-
gued that the product was "airline ticket distribution services." In reality though,
the most important service offered by a CRS is its information, thus the product
definition must be the narrower "computer reservation services." Id.
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The relevant geographic market is the area of effective
competition in which competing firms operate.8 0 The rel-
evant geographic market definition for the CRS industry
is complicated, having both regional and national charac-
teristics."1 The more plausible definition, however, is a
regional one.
Though a single CRS may compete throughout the na-
tion, making the market national, 2 there arises a strong
correlation, however, between areas where a CRS vendor
offers a large number of flights and areas where the ma-
jority of its CRS's are sold. 83 Using the Dallas-Fort Worth
area as an example, American is the dominant carrier and
its CRS, SABRE, has 280 agent subscribers accounting for
eighty-eight percent of travel agent sales revenue in the
region.84 United, which operates no flights in the area,
has only four agent subscribers accounting for one per-
cent of sales revenue.8 5 These facts lend support to a re-
gional market definition. In addition, CRS vendors do
not even attempt to sell their systems in areas where they
do not have substantial air traffic activity, requiring at
least the prospect of high sales volume before allowing an
agency to subscribe.86 Subscribing carriers view the geo-
graphic market as regional as well. Under a hub and
spoke system, 7 subscribing carriers will only desire access
to the CRS system in operation in the regional areas in
8o United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93
(1956).
8, VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 63, at § 8.02[2][b].
82 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,544.
84 Id.
84 Id.
- Id. In Denver, where the situation is reversed, United's APOLLO is responsi-
ble for the majority of travel agent sales revenue. Id.
81; Id.
87 Id. Most airlines operate on a hub and spoke system. The structure involves
the use of a central airport from which the majority of a carrier's flights will ema-
nate. The flights radiate outward from the "hub" to other cities where passengers
can transfer to or from the "spokes" of other systems. For most carriers, these
hub and spoke systems are decidely regional, thus when a carrier sells its CRS in
its principal area of operations it is selling in a limited region of the country. Id.
which they concentrate their air traffic.8" Therefore, as
both CRS owners and subscribers view the CRS market as
regional, for analytical purposes the relevant market defi-
nition should be regional as well.
Confusingly, many traditional factors used to determine
geographic market definitions lend support to a national
definition. A firm's approach to business planning and
operations has been cited as a factor in defining the geo-
graphic market.8 9 In United States v. Grinnell Corp., a na-
tional alarm services provider utilized regionally
operated, affiliate stations for distribution. °0  The
Supreme Court held that since there was national plan-
ning and operation, the local nature of the individual sta-
tions was irrelevant for analytical purposes. 91 All CRS
vendors are able, and usually willing, to sell their systems
anywhere in the nation. 2 Since correlation between air
service and CRS presence 93 is significant, as CRS hosts ex-
pand their routes their market presence will increase na-
tionwide as well.94 Because a distinct market exists when
the sellers make pricing and output decisions without re-
gard to sellers elsewhere, 95 the market characteristics as-
sociated with a regional definition may disappear at a later
date.
At least one court has taken the approach of identifying
submarkets in antitrust analysis.9 6 In Case-Swayne Co. v.
Sunkist Growers, Inc. ,9 the Ninth Circuit held that while in
88 Id.
119 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 574-76 (1966) (defining the
market so as to reflect "the reality of the way in which they built and conducted
their business").
Id. at 566-70.
91 Id. at 575-76.
92 Hearings, supra note 5, at 40.
93 See supra, notes 83 - 88 and accompanying text.
94 Hearings, supra note 5, at 40.
95 SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at 68.
911 Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1966) (held
that the orange products market was nationwide and was tied to the "product
orange" supply, but that regional product orange submarkets exist in commercial
reality and for antitrust purposes).
97 Id.
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many respects a market may be national, a court can, for
antitrust purposes, look to relevant submarkets for market
definitions.98 The court further held that market defini-
tions should reflect the "geographic structure of supplier-
customer relations"99 and must "correspond to the com-
mercial realities of the industry." 00 This approach would
find regional submarkets for CRS services because of the
relation of air transportation presence to CRS use. CRS
vendors sell to customers who have limited, regional op-
erations. Futhermore, a look at market concentration sta-
tistics of CRS owners in relation to their air traffic
presence shows that in reality the CRS geographic market
is regional. The significance of this assertion for measur-
ing monopoly power can be seen from examining market
concentration percentages.
Using a national market definition, the market shares
for CRS vendors are relatively low. 01 For example, forty-
one percent of all automated travel agencies use Ameri-
can's SABRE, accounting for forty-nine percent of CRS-
generated revenue.10 2 For United's APOLLO, the figures
were twenty-eight percent and thirty-one percent respec-
tively.10 3 While significant, the numbers fall far short of
market percentages cited as evidence of a monopoly. 10 4
The fifty to sixty percent range is usually given as a mini-
mum share for a finding of monopoly power. 10 5 Thus, a
1) Id. at 456.
m. Id. at 457 (citing United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963)).
Id. at 456.
VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 63, at § 8.02[3][b].
102 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,649 (citing Department of Justice statistics from June of
1983).
0,3 Id. TWA's PARS accounted for sixteen percent of agency subscribers and
twelve percent of domestic revenues. Id.
104 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 63, at § 8.02[3][b]. See id. at n.69 for cases
grouped according to the defendants' levels of market concentration. Market per-
centages as high as seventy-five percent have been held not to be indicative of
monopoly power absent other factors. Id.
1, Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 424; Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal
Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1976).
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national market definition would present a difficult obsta-
cle to finding monopoly power.
Under a regional definition, however, concentration
figures change dramatically. Twenty-nine urban areas ex-
ist where a CRS accounts for more than a forty percent
share of the market, with five areas having CRS market
shares of seventy percent or more. 0 6 Some of these mar-
ket concentrations would satisfy the concentration re-
quirements laid out by the courts, 10 7 but for the most part
even the higher concentrations in the regional markets
would not alone be sufficient evidence of monopoly
power. High concentration is almost never conclusive ev-
idence of monopoly. 108 Other factors, however, may show
that CRS vendors have greater market power than their
regional shares indicate.
Entry Barriers and Industry Structure
The examination of other relevant factors is necessary
to place market concentration statistics in context. It is
well settled that the "relative effect of percentage com-
mand of a market varies with the setting in which the fac-
tor is placed."' 0 9 For example, a firm with a very high
market share will not possess market power if new firms
could readily enter the market. In this situation, a domi-
nant firm cannot substantially raise prices or restrict out-
put, the very definition of monopoly power." 0 For these
reasons, entry barriers are considered "crucial" factors in
0- 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,649. The statistics are from a Department of Justice
study. The study was based on urban markets with at least $100 million of annual
revenue. The percentages refer to travel agent subscribers of CRS's. Id.
,07 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 424.
1- VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 63, at 8-34.2. Only percentages of eighty or
more have alone been held to be indicative of monopoly power. Id.
001 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 528 (1948).
,,0 SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at 77. Conversely, a firm with less than a fifty per-
cent share may have the power to expand or utilize its relative economies of scale
against remaining smaller firms or firms wishing to enter. Unique resources or
methods, economies of scale, or other barriers may be such that the firm can con-
trol the industry without fear of competition from new firms or other smaller
firms. Id.
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any evaluation of market power."'
There are numerous obstacles for new firms in the CRS
industry which could be held to be market entry barriers.
One major barrier is capital costs. Estimates vary, but the
lowest estimate for initial capital expenditures to develop
a new system is $100 million.'' 2 American's President,
Robert L. Crandell, claims that American's SABRE is the
most enormous, sophisticated, and complex computer
system in the world." 3 It is unclear in light of the rapidly
advancing level of computer technology, with the related
decrease in costs, what would actually be required today.
In any case, the amount would be enormous. Another as-
pect of these costs is that there is no salvage value for
used equipment because of the specialized nature of the
equipment.' Additionally, there are efficiencies to be
gained from operation on a large scale because of high
fixed costs."' New entrants would need to enter with a
fairly large share of the market in order to avoid sus-
taining large losses." 16 Another cost is development time.
CRS's require programmers to work with the database. A
training program for these specialized technicians nor-
mally takes six months to two years." 7 Furthermore, the
special features of the major CRS's, seen as essential for
effective competition, would take additional time." 8 The
nature of the industry complicates the analysis. Since
computer technology changes daily and the CRS industry
i Id. at 77.
12 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,650. The estimate is the Justice Department's. United
reported to the CAB for purpose of the CAB's investigation that it spent $500
million on APOLLO over the years of its operation. American reported develop-
ment costs of $160 million. Id.
I Computer Reservation Systems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 75
(1985) (hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings)
114 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,650.
3 AREEDA AND TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at 49 (1978).
49 Fed. Reg. at 11,650.
"17 Id. The programmers would have to be trained because of a shortage of
experienced programmers familiar with the problems peculiar to the CRS indus-
try. Id.
-'" Id.
is so young, it is hard to predict whether costs will remain
so high. "9 Recent scientific advances and marketing fea-
tures can already be seen aiding newer entrants. 20
Consumer preferences also act to bar market entry.
Travel agents desire the special features of systems like
SABRE and APOLLO, such as bookkeeping, car rentals,
and boarding passes. A new entrant would have to match
these to compete. Travel agents also prefer to use the
system of the major carrier in the area. 12' Travel agents
gain more direct communication, higher commissions,
and better business relationships by using the CRS of the
dominant carrier in the area. 22
In general, converting travel agents from one system to
another presents a substantial entry barrier. Agents'
leases are uniformly long and the standard lease includes
a liquidated damages clause in the event of cancella-
tion. 23 The leases also prohibit the use of two different
CRS's simultaneously. 124 Aside from the contract terms,
agents will also be reluctant to switch to a new system be-
cause of their familiarity with the old system. For an
agent to use a new system, he or she would need to stop
work and undergo a complete retraining program. 25 In
general, agents' loyalty to their favorite carrier creates a
conversion problem. The marketing policies of the major
CRS's have directly caused the conversion problems. 26
Together these restraints constitute a significant barrier
to entry.
Probably the most significant barrier to entry is the im-
Hearings, supra note 5, at 108.
12 Id. An example of a new marketing feature can be found in Delta's DATAS
II, which offers "unbiased" access. Id.
12 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,652.
"22Hearings, supra note 5, at 107.
12- 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,651. In APOLLO contracts, the liquidated damages
clause requires the agent to pay eighty percent of the remaining rentals due. Id.
124 Id. at 11,651-52. See generally supra notes 36, 37 and accompanying text for
a more detailed discussion of lease terms.
, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,652. One study found that most agents did not "express
even the slightest interest in switching systems." Id.
126~ Id.
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portance of incremental revenues to the profitability of
CRS's. Incremental revenues are the added revenues
gained from slight increases in load factors, the percent-
age of occupied seats on a flight. 27 Once a flight has
enough passengers to recover its fixed costs, revenue
from additional passengers is mostly profit because the
costs per each additional passenger constitute only a por-
tion of the fare.' 28 The added profit from incremental
revenues provides the major source of revenue for CRS
owners. 29 CRS vendors in high volume areas have signif-
icantly increased their load factors and their profits. 3 0
The use of CRS's to accomplish this will be discussed
later, but clearly, a market entrant must be able to gener-
ate this type of revenue.
Charging agents and carriers on the basis of system cost
would price the new entrant out of the market.' 3' Tym-
share, Inc.'s MARS PLUS system offers an example of this
problem.132 Because Tymshare does not provide air
transportation it does not realize incremental revenues.
MARS PLUS admits a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis
carrier-owned systems because it must recover its costs di-
rectly from travel agents.1 33 The importance of incremen-
tal revenues is demonstrated by CRS vendors' marketing
policies, policies which place most of the emphasis on in-
cremental revenues as a revenue source. 134 This emphasis
has proven effective. American's proceeds related to in-
cremental revenues generated by CRS ownership topped
$150 million, while United's topped $160 million. 35 The
,17 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,652. Costs per flight are fixed, profits are realized only
when the load factor is above a certain "breakeven" point. Id. Obviously, airlines
strive to increase their load factors.
12. Id.
129 Id. In-house estimates of various airlines reveal that as much as eighty per-
cent of incremental revenue is profit. Id.
130 Id.
13, Id. at 11,653.
1'2 Hearings, supra note 5, at 60-61.
'- Id. at 61.
114 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,650. The two other sources of revenue are charges to
travel agent subscribers and charges to carriers for CRS access. Id.
I.- Id.
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power of CRS vendors to control price and access is di-
rectly attributable to incremental revenues.
Other structural aspects of an industry can affect the
market power associated with particular market shares.
The future prospects for an industry are one such factor.
In expanding industries market shares have less signifi-
cance.1 36 This situation currently exists in the CRS indus-
try, with the number of agent subscribers increasing from
4,000 in 1980 to over 17,000 today.1 37 Both Delta Air
Lines and Eastern Airlines have been able to enter the
CRS market, but with only mixed results, capturing only
insignificant market shares. 38 Their entry takes little of
the force away from the data showing high entry barriers.
The magnitude and number of entry barriers increases
the significance of measured market shares. Where entry
barriers are present, figures as high as eighty percent or
more might be held conclusive evidence of monopoly
power.' 3 9 Regional shares between fifty and eighty per-
cent would strongly indicate monopoly power. 40 Both
American and United could be violating the Sherman Act
in a number of their regional markets based solely on the
factors discussed thus far.
Performance Analysis
Structural analysis has become a central focal point in
most antitrust cases. Performance criteria becomes
equally important in many cases. Performance analysis in-
volves empirical comparison of a monopolistic industry
with a competitive industry. To the extent that the data
shows price, profits, and other performance criteria which
favor the monopolist, inferences about monopoly power
.. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass 1953),
afd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). The court cited industry expansion as a fac-
tor that would decrease the significance of a given market share. Id.
,.7 Hearings, supra note 5, at 108.
1- 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,649. Delta and Eastern together account for only seven
percent of all subscribers.
I-" VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 63, at § 8.02[3][b].
140 Id.
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can be drawn from the analysis. 1 4
Applying the analysis to the CRS industry, pricing con-
duct and profit performance represent two areas where
the CRS industry deviates from the norm. One hallmark
of monopoly power is the ability to raise or lower prices
without concern for competitors, especially when price
bears no relation to cost. 14 2 This ability exists in the CRS
industry. A number of carriers have complained that the
booking fees charged by the major airlines bear no rela-
tion to cost. For ins.tance, fees far exceed costs incurred
in leasing in-house systems. 4 ' The fees also exceed those
charged by the minor CRS vendors. 4 4 Another aspect of
most booking fees is that a particular carrier's fees will
vary directly with the magnitude of that carrier's competi-
tive threat. "15 Thus the most competitive carrier must
pay the highest fee. If carriers' complaints are valid,
strong inferences of monopoly power can be made.
Abnormally high profits infer monopoly power and are
evidence of market power. 4 6 The profits and returns on
CRS investments are extremely high. 47 The return on in-
vestment for a CRS ranges from twenty-four percent to
ninety-five percent.' 48 Unfortunately, the analytical in-
consistencies associated with performance analysis in gen-
eral apply to the measurement of profits. 49 For instance,
if profits were measured on the basis of cash payments,
"' SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at 82-83. Performance analysis is often criticized for
being inherently inaccurate. Id. at 83. Its main benefit seems to be as a supple-
ment to structural analysis. Id.
142 Id.
' Hearings, supra note 5, at 83.
144 Id.
, Hearings, supra note 5, at 83-84.
.... SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at 85.
, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,650. The profit figures for the most part are based on
incremental revenues. The major CRS owners argue that incremental revenues
should not be included in profit measurement. At the same time though both
major CRS's are acutely aware of the importance of incremental revenues. Re-
turns on investment can be as high as ninety-five percent with payback periods of
only one year. Id.
148 Id.
149 SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at 83.
COMMENT
rather than including profits from incremental revenues,
the figures would be considerably lower. 50 Certainly a
more extensive fact finding would be required in order to
make any conclusions about CRS profits and monopoly
power.
In reviewing factors used to measure market power, the
market characteristics and performance of the CRS indus-
try give no definitive answer to the monopoly question.
The evidence available at present suggests that monopoly
power exists in the CRS industry. Viewing market shares
of the major CRS vendors on a regional basis with the ad-
ditional considerations of substantial entry barriers and
performance suggestive of monopoly power, market
power appears much greater than market shares initially
indicate. In areas with high concentration, a finding of
monopoly power could be justified. If such a finding is
accepted, the next step is to examine conduct in the mar-
ket to determine whether monopoly power is being used
or maintained, thereby satisfying the second element of
the Sherman Act prohibition against monopolization.
B. Conduct Analysis
The second major part of an antitrust analysis under
the Sherman Act involves ascertaining whether a firm with
monopoly power has used that power unlawfully. 15  A
court must find a "purpose or intent" to exercise monop-
oly power to impede competition or exclude competi-
tors. 5 2 Three tests exist by which conduct may be
evaluated. The first test examines whether the firm delib-
erately sought to acquire monopoly power.1 53 The sec-
ond test examines whether the firm maintained a
monopoly by predatory or exclusionary practices. 54 The
50 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,545.
' ' SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at 94.
152 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
,53 See generally, United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
154 See generally, United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953).
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third test establishes a prima facie case of monopolization
following a finding of monopoly power, but allows the
firm to prove the monopoly was innocently acquired or
maintained. 55 Present case law is unclear as to which test
should be applied, yet the law clearly encompasses at
least the second test and probably requires some showing
of intent. For purposes of this discussion, however, de-
tailed analysis similar to an antitrust case will not be possi-
ble. Nonetheless, an understanding of the
anticompetitive problems of the CRS industry may be
reached by analogizing between conduct of CRS owners
and conduct that has been held to satisfy the intent
requirement.
Increasing Entry Barriers
One type of conduct held to violate Section 2 consists
of activity which tends to increase existing barriers to en-
try in an industry.' 56 Increasing entry barriers changes
market structure into a less competitive form by reducing
the threat of new entry or expansion. In effect, market
shares, though fixed, will represent more power.I- 7 There
are numerous instances of practices designed to increase
entry barriers. CRS vendors' use of increasingly restric-
tive lease contracts, with 'exclusivity of system' and liqui-
dated damage provisions, 58 presents the new entrant
with agent conversion problems. To achieve needed econ-
omies of scale, 5 9 the new entrant must convert agents be-
cause only ten percent of all agents are not presently
under contract. 60 Though the number of newly auto-
mated agencies is growing,' 61 the current trend toward
155 SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at 37.
5 6 United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 295.
'57 See supra notes 109 - 147 and accompanying text for a discussion of entry
barriers.
158 See supra notes 123 - 126 and accompanying text.
,5 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,650.
,6 Hearings, supra note 5, at 108.
161 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,655. The ten percent figure refers to revenue. Only ten
percent of agent revenue is not generated under a CRS contact. Id.
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longer lease terms by United and American only de-
creases the chance that a new entrant will be able to con-
vert agencies.
The increasing reliance of the major carriers on incre-
mental revenues to recover costs also acts to increase en-
try barriers. Because CRS vendors can use incremental
revenues to reduce subscription costs to agents, new en-
trants must have the ability to generate incremental reve-
nues as well. 162 Since these types of revenues are a direct
result of air transportation presence, 163 most new entrants
will not be in the position to generate incremental reve-
nue. The lackluster success of the only recent entrants,
Delta and Eastern, may be traced, among other things, to
their inability to generate sufficient revenue in this way.
Increasing the complexity and number of various op-
tional and standard features, such as advance boarding
pass capabilities, constitutes another example of conduct
designed to increase entry barriers. 164 A new entrant
must match each new option to compete effectively. Each
option increases both the cost and time required for sys-
tem development, making new entry unattractive.
Unlawful Exercises of Monopoly Power
Monopolistic conduct need not be aimed solely at in-
creasing or maintaining monopoly power. Conduct which
does not directly reduce competition in the industry may
nonetheless be unlawful to the extent that it reduces com-
petition in a related industry or is predatory in nature. 65
There exist three types of conduct in the CRS industry
I' 6 Hearings, supra note 5, at 103.
163 Id.
- 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,650. One factor in Eastern's lack of market penetration
has been its failure to offer an accounting package option with its system. Thus,
its sales are limited to smaller agencies who do not require such an option. Id.
15 SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at 46-48. The basic purpose of the Sherman Act is
to increase competition. The assumption is that competition benefits society.
Thus it prohibits predatory behavior and less serious conduct that inhibits compe-
tition. Id.
1791985]
180 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
which qualify: discriminatory pricing, system bias, and dis-
criminatory selection.
1. Pricing Conduct
Discriminatory pricing policies are seen as evidence of
monopoly power and an unlawful exercise of that
power. 166 CRS vendors discriminate in the prices charged
non-host carriers for access to the system.' 67 The costs to
include a carrier in a CRS database are relatively fixed. 168
Yet charges to carriers vary, from twenty-five cents per
booking to three dollars per booking. 169 Many carriers al-
lege that the fees charged vary directly with the subscrib-
ing carrier's competitive threat, and are used to decrease
the profitability of discount carriers. 170 Some carriers can
negotiate the fees because of their air transportation pres-
ence in a given market.17 ' A CRS would not be marketa-
ble if it excluded all of the flights of a major carrier. In
addition to prices, net ticketing agreements, referred to




System bias constitutes by far the most serious abuse
committed by CRS vendors. System bias consists of alter-
ing the display shown on an agent's terminal so what
seems like objective flight information in fact favors the
CRS vendor's flights. 74 There are three different types of
bias: screen bias, connecting point bias, and database
bias. CRS vendors use bias to increase the number of
14i.. Id. at 121.
167 Hearings, supra note 5, at 81.
-8 Id. at 83.
I" d. at 82.
,70 Id. at 83, 84.
171 Id. at 84.
,72 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
173 Id.
174 Hearings, supra note 5, at 66-77. See also supra notes 21-32 and accompanying
text.
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bookings made through their CRS that result in passen-
gers on their flights. The air transportation industry has
three levels: air transportation services, reservation infor-
mation distribution, and air transportation sales. 175 Car-
rier-owned CRS's represent vertical integration 7 6 of the
first two levels. 177 Bias involves the use of CRS vendor's
position on the second level (information distribution) to
affect competition at the first level (transportation). Thus
bias has obvious antitrust implications.
The major type of bias, and the one most vehemently
attacked, is screen bias. Not all applicable information
pertaining to a consumer's flight request can be shown to
the agent on one screen because of the physical limita-
tions of a CRS terminal. 7 8 In most screen formats, four
to ten flights can be shown at one time. 179 Obviously, a
well-traveled route could generate four or five screens of
information. The problem arises when travel agents do
not search all the screens. In theory, an agent will be
thorough. In practice, however, most agents book the
first suitable flight that appears. Seventy to ninety percent
of all bookings are made off the first screen, fifty percent
off the first line. 180 Consequently, CRS vendors have a
great incentive to ensure that, as often as possible, their
flights will appear before others, thereby increasing incre-
175 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,646. "[Information distribution] is the level at which con-
sumers actually purchase air transportation services." Id.
1- Vertical integration is the combination of two levels of an industry under
one firm's management. From original production to final sale, an industry has a
number of levels of activity. When one firm operates simultaneously on one level
and the adjacent level in the chains it is said to be vertically integrated. SULLIVAN,
supra note 61, at § 57.
,77 Cohen, supra note 78, at 152.
1 7 Hearings, supra note 5, at 66-77. All systems have a built-in "structural bias."
Id. at 68. The information selected by the system to be transferred from the
database to the terminal is chosen using parameters. For example, on one system
a flight between two cities may be shown based on the preferred departure time
inputed by the agent. Another system may use a combination of the departure
time and the number of connections involved. Structural bias exists in any system
and is unavoidable. It is argued, however, that even the choice of structural bias is
competitively motivated. Id.
1 I7 d. at 67.
1 - Id.
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mental revenues. By using selected criteria, vendors can
program their CRS's to list flights in this manner.
Systems can be programmed, or biased, so that flights
of a certain carrier appear before all others. 18 1 CRS's en-
hance this effect by designating criteria that will also favor
their flights, such as programming the system to prefer
wide body jets to smaller ones and multi-class service over
uniform service. 82 One blatant example of screen bias
occurs when a competing carrier has a departure or arri-
val time that matches a consumer's needs and the CRS
vendor does not. The CRS vendor will place its flight that
approximates the requested time ahead of a rival's that
matches exactly. 83 An agent will book the "less desira-
ble" flight, despite knowledge of the bias, because a com-
plete search costs the agent more in terms of money and
time. 84 Overall, screen bias favors the CRS vendor's
flights over the other carriers', robbing the latter of the
fares of incremental passengers, a crucial element of prof-
itability in the airline industry.' 85
The second type of bias, connecting point bias, selects
favorable connecting points for flights with intermediate
stops. 86 All flights involving connections use a certain
airport as a connecting point.' 87 In constructing their
flight systems, carriers designate and develop particular
airports as connecting points. 188 Since a system cannot
include all possible connections, most CRS's picked a lim-
ited number of connecting points as a start.' 89 The prob-
lem comes from the resulting exclusion of the flights of a
carrier who does not use one of the CRS designated
points as its connecting point. 90 Utilizing this situation,
18' 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,550.
182 Id.
,83 Hearings, supra note 5, at 68.
104 Id.
1- 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,652.
186 Hearings, supra note 5, at 73-74.





host carriers design their systems to choose their major
connection bases as connecting points and ignore those
of competing carriers. 91 In addition, for each connecting
point, host carrier's CRS's still favor their flights over
other carriers' flights with the same connections. 92 Con-
necting point bias concerns carriers as much as screen
bias. Screen bias can be overcome by an agent requesting
additional screens, but connecting point bias is virtually
undetectable and relatively unknown to agents. 193
The third type of bias, database bias, is not so much a
manipulation of information as it is a withholding.
Database bias refers to the problem of inaccurate and
tardy information processing. All reservation information
must be fed into the database by the CRS owner. 194 Thus
the owner is at liberty to withhold information at will.
The ability to dictate the input of information has been
abused by CRS venders in a number of ways: delaying
input of information on fares, especially where a competi-
tor's new low fare is involved; omitting or misstating flight
information for routes used by the CRS owner's flights;
displaying available flights as full; and neglecting to dis-
continue a competitor's low fare offer so that extra, but
unwanted, low fare passengers are added.195 These
abuses have the same impact on carriers as the complete
denial of access to a CRS, but like connecting point bias,
they are difficult to discover. 196
Customer Selection and the Essential Facility Doctrine
Discriminatory selection in the CRS industry closely re-
sembles a recognized doctrine of antitrust law, the "es-
'9' Id. at 74.
192 Id.
'.. Id. at 73.
Id. at 89.
"95 Id. at 90. Abuses such as the ones mentioned were involved in the investiga-
tion into the Braniff bankruptcy. Id.
-; Id. at 91. All the aforementioned practices are disputed by CRS owners,
who claim they are the result of unintentional loading errors. Id.
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sential facility" doctrine. 9 7 The premise of the doctrine
is that when a vertically integrated monopolist controls a
nonduplicable resource 9 8 at one level that is essential to
competition in a second level, it must offer the resource to
all on the same terms.199 The Supreme Court first recog-
nized the doctrine in United States v. St. Louis Terminal Rail-
road Association.20 ° It has been followed and defined in
other cases, remaining a viable doctrine despite scholarly
criticism. 20 '
United States v. St. Louis Terminal Railroad Association ,202
the principle case advocating the essential facility doc-
trine, involved the control of the railroad terminal system
in St. Louis by a single holding company comprised of a
number of railroads.2 °3 The geography of St. Louis
forced any continuous railroad line to utilize one of three
river crossings. 20 4 The holding company in Terminal Rail-
road bought the three independent terminals providing
through routes, and began to prefer its member railroads
over others in the use of the terminals.2 0 5 The Court con-
sidered the discriminatory treatment a restraint of trade
and required the holding company to act as an impartial
provider of services.2 0 6
Another major case, Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States,z °7 concerned a public utility. The Otter Tail Power
Company was the only electric company that could pro-
vide towns in its area with wholesale electric power.20 8
,7 A.D. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 66-69 (2d ed.
1970).
1 1 Id. at 992. "[I]t is sufficient if duplication of the facility would be econonli-
cally infeasible .... ." Id.
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 470 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
224 U.S. 383 (1912).
2111 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 115, at 779g.
2 0 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
2"- Id. at 394.
204 Id. at 395.
2o15 Id.
2 6 Id. at 410.
20,7 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
21" Id. at 370. This applied to both direct supply and indirect supply by means
of "wheeling," transferring power from other suppliers. Id.
The towns in question needed the wholesale power in or-
der to establish their own municipal systems. These sys-
tems' power would eventually replace Otter Tail's retail
sales.20 9 Because of the threat of lost retail sales, Otter
Tail refused to sell wholesale power to towns proposing
municipal systems, thus defeating their plans and insuring
future retail sales. 21 0 The Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's finding of a Sherman Act violation, classify-
ing Otter Tail's refusals as the use of monopoly power in
one market to increase market power in another and
therefore a restraint of trade.21  The First Circuit in
Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Building21 2 also in-
voked the rule of Terminal R. R. The defendant owned the
building preferred by the produce market.2 13 Retail buy-
ers were accustomed to shopping there. Attempted alter-
native sites had failed. 2 4 For these reasons, the court
considered the defendant's building an essential facilty
for the local produce market 21 5 and held that when a firm
with both the power and motive to exclude does so with-
out economic justification, there is prima facie proof of
intent to monopolize.21 6
From a reading of the cases, certain distinct elements
exist which must be established for a monopolist's exclu-
sionary and predatory practices in a related market to be
held a violation of the Sherman Act. First, there must be a
vertically integrated monopolist. Next, the monopolist
must have control or access to some resource or facility
2093 Id. at 369-71.
210 Id. at 377. The Court cited United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), as
authority for the holding.
21 1 410 U.S. at 382.
212 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952).
2 1 Id. at 486.
21. Id. at 487.
21. Id. at 488.
2 1 Id. Other cases involving the essential facility doctrine and the holding in
Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. 383 (1912), are Hecht v. Pro-Football, 470 F.2d 982 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), LaPeyre v. F.T.C., 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966), Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); compare McQuade Tours Inc. v. Consolidated Air
Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109
(1973), and Official Airline Guides v. F.T.C., 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980).
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not commonly enjoyed or available to competitors at the
second level. The facility or resource must be indispensa-
ble to firms in that second level. Indispensable, however,
means only that denying a firm its use would create severe
economic hardships. In addition, the facility need not be
completely unique or nonduplicative. It is sufficient if the
realities of the industry are such that competitors, and es-
pecially new entrants, cannot possibly duplicate it eco-
nomically or in the time needed for effective competition.
The final requirement is that the monopolist, having of-
fered the resource to buyers, then discriminates among
buyers on some basis other than justifiable economic
considerations.
The CRS industry encompasses most of the above men-
tioned elements. CRS's are facilities essential to air trans-
portation sales. Most airlines and agents agree that
access to a CRS is not only important but has no effective
substitutes.2 17 Unlike the cited cases, however, there is no
one central facility.21 8 In the CRS industry, at least three
CRS's possess large numbers of agent subscribers. 2 9 But
CRS's are not like railroad terminals because access to
one is not necessarily enough. Evidence suggests that in
areas when two CRS's have large market shares, a carrier
must have access to both.220 Only in this way will the car-
rier reach a large number of automated agents.2 21 So for
the individual non-host carriers, the existence of more
than one "facility" in no way makes a single CRS less
indispensable.
CRS's are not easily duplicated. As established when
discussing entry barriers, CRS's require huge capital out-
lays and a considerable amount of development time.222
Recent CRS entrants Delta and Eastern have barely been
able to establish themselves, despite their strength in the
217 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,646.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 11,649.
22o 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,545.
22, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,651.
222 See supra notes 112-140 and accompanying text.
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air transportation market and a developed in-house sys-
tem. They have not duplicated the major CRS's and still
must buy access to those systems.2 The average poten-
tial entrant lacking the strengths of Delta and Eastern
would consider the development of a CRS impossible.224
If we assume that CRS owners are vertically inte-
grated,22 5 the remaining element needed is discriminatory
treatment of the buyer. In the CRS industry this is well
documented. CRS owners charge carriers access fees that
vary over a large range.2 26 Carriers that are in direct com-
petition for passengers with CRS vendors are often faced
with higher fees or even denied access completely.227
With regard to flight data there is unequal treatment as
well. Again, competing carriers' data is subject to mis-
statement and delayed loading.228 In addition, bias is usu-
ally directed towards the most competitive carriers,
resulting in fewer bookings and profits while increasing
the same for the vendor. 22 9
In sum, the CRS industry's characteristics fit those char-
acteristics of other situations where the essential facility
doctrine has been invoked. Accordingly, a court would be
justified in requiring CRS owners to offer access to their
systems on an equal basis. In the CRS industry, however,
the defendants are different. In many of the cited cases,
the defendant was an association of more than one en-
tity;2 30 in Terminal,231 a group of railroads; in Associated
232 233n oPress, a group of newspapers; in Hecht,2  a group of
football teams; and in Gamco,234 a jointly owned building.
223 Hearings, supra note 5, at 544 (statement of Robert L. Crandell, President of
American Airlines).
224 See supra notes 112-138 and accompanying text.
225 Cohen, supra note 78, at 153.




23o See supra notes 231-234.
23, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
2-12 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
233 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
224 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952).
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While some cases note this aspect, 2 5 it is not stressed as
an important factor. Since the basis of the doctrine is to
prohibit the use of monopoly power in other markets by a
vertically integrated monopolist, it would not seem to
matter whether the monopolist is a single entity or an
association.
IV. CAB RULEMAKING
After numerous complaints from carriers and a con-
gressional investigation, the House Subcommittee on Avi-
ation directed the CAB to investigate the CRS problem
and take whatever action was deemed necessary.236 The
primary motive of the Subcommittee was to have the CAB
adopt interim measures to protect carriers and air trans-
portation consumers while the Justice Department investi-
gated the legal options.23 7  Based on the
recommendations from the Justice Department, the CAB
proceeded with the rulemaking. 238 The rule's application
23 See Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. 383.
236 Hearings, supra note 5, at 716 (letter ofJuly 15, 1983, from Norman Y. Mineta,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, to Dan McKinnon, Chairman, CAB). The
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, section 411, granted the CAB the power to investi-
gate problems and issue orders whenever it found "unfair or deceptive practices
or unfair methods of competition." Pub. L. No. 85-726, Title IV, § 411, 72 Stat.
769 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (Supp. 1984-85)). The power is broad and in-
cludes the ability to address "any practice that destroys competition and estab-
lishes a monopoly." 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,541. The CAB based its conclusion on its
view that its Section 411 was similar in scope to the Federal Trade Commission"s
(FTC) authority. The actions taken were to be preventive in nature, just as the
FTC's are designed to be. Id. (citing FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321
(1966). "Practices" may include any "which conflict with the basic policies of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually violate
those laws." 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,541. See supra note 229. The general purpose of
such authority is to prevent anti-competitive practices and avoid the need to re-
sort to the antitrust laws. 49 Fed. Reg. at 32, 542 . The CAB exercised its author-
ity in August of 1984 and issued a rule, effective November 1984, which seeks to
correct the abuses of the CRS owners.
.7 Hearings, supra note 5, at 715. "Although an antitrust case may be the best
long run solution to the problem, such a case is likely to take years to complete
and, if there are no limitations on anti-competitive practices in the interim, there
is a threat of irreparable injury to consumers and competitors .. " Id.
2, The Justice Department had declined to bring antitrust actions against the
CRS vendors. Senate Hearings, supra note 113, at 25 (written statement of Charles
F. Dole, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of
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is limited in scope. Its restrictions are to apply only to
carrier-owned CRS's. 239 Thus Tymshare, a system owned
by a company unaffiliated with air transportation, is ex-
empted. In exempting CRS's like Tymshare, the CAB be-
lieved that both the incentive and the capacity to engage
in anti-competitive conduct were missing.240 The Board
was careful, however, to define the term "carrier" broadly
so as to include any affiliates. Carrier-owned or con-
trolled companies are included within the scope of the
rule.241  The system itself is defined narrowly. A CRS is
defined as a system that offers information and the ability
to make reservations and issue tickets.242 The definition
excludes systems that merely offer information. Thus a
system that lists flights and fares, but provides no commu-
nication with the carrier, would not be subject to the
rule.243
The main thrust of the rule is to attack anti-competitive
display formats. It contains restrictions affecting screen
bias, 44 connecting point bias, 45 and database bias.246
For the first two, the rule prohibits flight ordering based
on carrier identity.2 47 The criteria for determining the or-
Justice). Litigation was a poor option because it could not provide industry-wide
relief, would require several cases in different jurisdictions with possibly different
results, would not address abuses of CRS vendors not sued, and would be ex-
tremely time consuming. Id. The Department ruled against divestiture as a rem-
edy because of its severity, the possible loss of efficiencies in the CRS market, and
the time required for its achievement. Id.
2.. 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,541 (referring to 14 C.F.R. §§ 255.2-.3).
24o 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,548. The difference is incremental revenues. Tymshare
and those similarly situated cannot realize such revenue. Since the profitablity of
incremental revenues is the major factor underlying CRS abuses, the lack of such
revenues destroys the incentive to engage in anticompetitive behavior using
CRS's. Id.
21, Id. Of special concern was the possiblity that a CRS owner could sell its
system in return for preferential display treatment. Id.
242 14 C.F.R. § 255.3 (1984). The major characteristic a system must possess to
be a CRS is two-way communication between the agent and the carrier. 49 Fed.
Reg. at 32,548.
2-, 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,548.
24 See supra notes 178-185 and accompanying text.
.1 See supra notes 186-193 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text.
247 14 C.F.R. § 255.4.
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der of the flight listings for a given departure time must
be based on service-related factors248 and be applied uni-
formly to all carriers including the CRS owner. 24 9 The
same type of restriction applies to the criteria for selecting
connecting points used in displaying connecting flights. 250
The effect of these restrictions is to eliminate the prefer-
ential listing of flights due to CRS ownership or co-host
agreements. To correct database bias, the rule requires
CRS vendors to treat the data of all its subscribers
equally. 25' The information loading procedure and the
timing of the loading must be substantially the same as if
the data were the vendors' own.252 Any direct computer
links offered to co-hosts must be offered to all buyers on
nondiscriminatory terms.25' The bias restrictions do not
apply, however, to treatment of carriers that refuse to pay
a nondiscriminatory access fee.254
The rule also restricts contract terms for carriers and
agents.255 Carrier contracts may not discriminate among
carriers in the fees charged for similar services.256 The
rule also prohibits contract provisions such as net ticket-
ing agreements.257 Agent contracts may not be for terms
longer than five years.258 The contract cannot condition
subscription on the use of only one system or require that
248 Id. § 255.4(b)(1). "[CRS vendors] may order the display of information on
the basis of any service criteria." Id. Service criteria might include the size of the
plane, the number of classes of cabin service, or special luxury features such as
movies. 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,550.
249 14 C.F.R. § 255.4(b)(1). The criteria eventually adopted must be available
upon request and the weight given specific factors in ordering information must
also be furnished. Id. § 255.5(b)(2).
50 Id. § 255.4(c).
25, Id. § 255.4(d).
"2I- Id. § 255.4(d)(1). In addition § 255.4(d)(2) requires vendors to inform car-
iers, upon request, as to the procedures used.
, 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,551.
2- 14 C.F.R. § 255.9(a). The restrictions also do not apply towards carriers
who refuse to enter into contracts that comply with the rule. Id.
25 Id. §§ 255.5, 255.6.
26 Id. § 255.5(a).
251 Id. § 255.5(b). See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text for an explana-
tion of net ticketing agreements.
'" Id. § 255.6(a).
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the CRS-owning carrier's ticket sales be made on its own
system.2 59 In addition, agent contracts may not base fees
on the identity of the carrier primarily sold by an agent.26 °
Thus, an agent who books a large number of flights on a
carrier that competes with a CRS vendor cannot be
charged more.
Rather than end the CRS controversy, the CAB's rules
seemed to heighten the intensity of the conflict. CRS
owners immediately developed procedures to circumvent
the rule, the major technique being a biased second
screen.26 1 Many carriers claimed that the original bias still
existed.26 2 Perhaps because of this, a group of eleven
smaller carriers brought a civil antitrust suit against Amer-
ican and United.26 3 The continuing controversy led the
Senate Subcommittee on Aviation to hold hearings on the
subject to determine if further action should be taken or
the rule merely amended.2 64
Many of the carriers most heavily affected by CRS abuse
were not satisifed with the CAB's rule, either with the type
of action taken or with specific sections of the rule. Re-
public Airlines and British Airways challenged the CAB's
rule in court. 265 Other carriers continued to complain to
the Congress and the Department of Transportation
.... Id. § 255.6(b), (c).
2- Id. § 255.6(e).
2, Senate Hearings, supra note 113, at 75 (statement of Robert Crandall, Presi-
dent, American Airlines, Inc.). The biased second screen is an optional display,
chosen by the agent, that is completely biased in favor of the CRS vendor. Id. at 7
(statement of Matthew Scocozza). The agent chooses a biased system because of
incentives offered by the CRS vendors. Id. at 26. See supra notes 174 - 185 and
accompanying text for a more complete discussion of the biased second screen.
262 Senate Hearings, supra note 113, at 29-73.
23 US Air, Inc. v. American Airlines, No. CV-84-8918 (C.D. Cal. filed Nov. 20,
1984). The plaintiffs in the action are US Air, Inc., Pacific, Southwest Airlines
Inc., AirCal, Inc., Ozark Airlines, Inc., Republic Airlines, Inc., Muse Air Corpora-
tion, Alaska Airlines, Inc., Midway Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc., West-
ern Airlines, Inc., and Pan American World Airways, Inc. Id.
2" Senate Hearings, supra note 113, at 2.
265 United Airlines Inc. v. Dole, No. 84-1877 (7th Cir. filed Feb. 25, 1985).
United's position on the rule was opposite to Republic's and British Airways, the
latter two challenging on the basis of inefficiency. Senate Hearings, supra note 238,
at 101-102.
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about the effect of the rules.26 6 Some argued that bias on
primary screens still existed. Others claimed that CRS
vendors' new across-the-board fees were not justified by
operating costs. 26 7 Many of the complaints of the non-
CRS carriers were the same as before the rule.
The major post-rule development is the non-CRS carri-
ers' civil antitrust action in federal district court in Cali-
fornia.268 At this early stage of the case, no new facts or
findings have surfaced regarding CRS abuse. In fact one
of the major problems of the case will be translatation of
raw economic data and corporate files into meaningful
statistics which will accurately reflect the actions of CRS
vendors. 269 As with any complex civil antitrust case, dis-
covery will be lengthy and tedious, and the final resolu-
tion may be years away.
Besides questions of compliance and adequacy, carriers
complained of two new CRS abuses, high fees and biased
second screens. One of the provisions of the CAB rule
required that CRS vendors not discriminate among carri-
ers as to fees. 2 70 The CAB had declined to set fees, how-
ever, and this led to increased fees for all carriers.27'
Some believe the higher, across-the-board fee has only in-
creased CRS profits, bearing no relation to costs or the
competitive rates of smaller CRS vendors.2 72 American
and United vehemently disclaim increased profits and
other carriers' cost figures.273
266 Senate Hearings, supra note 113, at 37-4 1.
267 Id. at 37.
2- U.S. Air, Inc., No. CV-84-8918. Damages claimed exceed $350 million. Id.
2- 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,650. Especially difficult to measure, though crucial to a
plaintiff's case, are incremental revenues, Id.
27 14 C.F.R. § 255.5 (1984).
,27 Senate Hearings, supra note 113, at 38. (written statement of Lamar Muse,
Chairman of the Board and CEO of Muse Air Corporation). Fees now range from
$1.75 to $1.85 for all participating carriers, which is often a substantial increase,
though in some instances it is a decrease. Id. Mr. Muse believes that "[a]ll the
CAB rules did was to prohibit American and United from raping only a few small
defenseless carriers as opposed to raping the entire industry." Id.
272 Id. at 36. Delta's Datas II systems charges a flat 75 cents per transaction. Id.
273 Id. at 75-76, 100-101. Mr. Crandall attributes Delta's lower fee to an in-
creased use of incremental revenues. Id. at 78.
The most blatant new abuse is the use of a biased sec-
ond screen. Both United and American offer a second
screen option to their agents which allows the agent to
switch to a completely biased display, biased wholly in
favor of the CRS vender.27" This new feature is designed
to allow the travel agency to lock all of its terminals into
the secondary screen with no ability for the individual
agent to switch back.2 75 As with the primary bias dis-
cussed earlier, the biased second screen diverts bookings
from participating carriers.
In response to the numerous and varied complaints and
the seeming ineffectiveness of the CAB's rule, the Senate
Subcommittee on Aviation felt the need to reexamine
Congress' role in the regulation of the airline industry.276
The Subcommittee considered two different options, di-
vestiture or amendment of the CAB's rule. The Senators
noted, however, that the rule had only been in effect for
four months. In general, the Subcommittee seemed re-
luctant to embrace any course of action at the time, espe-
cially divestiture.2 77  The testimony came from the
Department of Transportation, non-CRS carriers, and
CRS vendors.
The Department of Transportation mainly concluded
that they had insufficient statistics from which to form an
opinion.2 78 Though aware of the alleged problems, the
Department's major concern seemed to be that wagons
should not be fixed until broken. In their view, no evi-
dence of inadequacies in the rule had surfaced.2 79 Having
just received the CAB's authority, the Department of
Transportation was naturally reluctant to immediately
274 Id. at 7, 16.
275 Id. at 7. Though the addition of the switch and the decision to use it are up
to the individual agencies, the CRS vendors have used various incentives to mar-
ket its use. Id. at 30.
•76 Id. at 1.
27 Id. at 1-2.
278 Id. at 9. (statement of Matthew Scocozza, Assistant Secretary, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, Department of Transpor-
tation). "What I am saying today ... is that we have no conclusions." Id.
279 Id. at 10.
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change the rule. The Department seemed even more re-
luctant to consider divestiture.28 On the whole, though
committed to strict enforcement of the CRS rules,2 8 ' the
Department of Transportation preferred to postpone any
action until conclusive findings had been made as to the
effectiveness of the rule.282 Secretary Dole, however, had
procured an agreement with United and American to
eliminate the use of the biased second screen.28 3
The Department of Justice recognized the problems
still plaguing the CRS industry as well as the new abuses.
The new abuses had not caused the Department ofJustice
to change their decision against litigation.2 84 The Depart-
ment of Justice's first recommendation was to revise or
amend the rules to correct CRS abuse, while keeping
open the options of antitrust litigation and divestiture. 28 5
The Department argued against divestiture because of the
loss of integrated efficiencies with no guarantee against
preferential contracts between CRS's and their former
owners. 286 The Department further recommended
against price regulation because of both "regulatory costs
and inefficiencies. "287
Divestiture failed to receive a sizable number of sup-
porters. CRS owners pointed to the problems of separat-
ing their in-house system from the main CRS and the
availability of less drastic means. 88 Some participating
carriers felt that divestiture would not solve the problem
280 Id. at 4-10.
2' Id. at 13.
282 Id. at 4. "The Department believes that it would be premature to undertake
measures like the regulation of access fees or divestiture. The rules have only
recently become effective and they should be given a chance to work. The magni-
tude and exact nature of any remaining problems with the rules are not fully clear,
and it is even less clear that extreme solutions are necessary." Id.
2 Id. at 13. The agreement was signed voluntarily on March 26, 1985, and
included Trans World Airlines. Id.
284 Id. at 17 (statement of Charles F. Rule, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice).
285 Id.
286 Id. at 25.
287 Id. at 16.
288 Id. at 84-85, 99, 141.
of monopoly price setting and would provide CRS ven-
dors with "huge capital gains. '2 89 Other carriers viewed
the combination of loopholes in the rule and huge finan-
cial incentives for violating the rule as requiring divesti-
ture. zoo With lackluster support among those vested with
the authority to force divestiture and those with the great-
est to gain from divestiture, such action appears unlikely
in the near future.
V. CONCLUSION
Probably the most astute observation regarding CRS
abuse is that of the Department of Transportation,
namely that the information is inconclusive. Depending
on your perspective and definitions of terms, both the
CRS vendors and the victim carriers could be correct.
Nonetheless, some conclusions seem certain.
First, CRS's are an essential and powerful element in
the commercial airline industry. All major carriers de-
pend in some measure on access to a CRS. CRS's have an
infinite potential for abuse and vendors have infinite in-
centives for abusing CRS's. It is the extent to which these
statements are correct that creates dissent.
A second conclusion that can be made is that CRS's
have been used to affect airline competition. United and
American do not dispute this fact, though quantitatively
they disagree with its significance. They respond that as
they were the risk takers, they should receive the fruits of
their success.
A third and crucial conclusion is that whatever free mar-
ket argument favors the deregulation and protection of
the CRS industry, CRS vendors did not develop their sys-
tems in the free market. From their inception, United,
American, and TWA operated under governmental regu-
2'89 Id. at 39.
I2 d. at 51 (statement of Phil Baker, President, Continental Airlines) "[T]he
only certain solution is to simply prohibit the ownership of CRS systems by all air
carriers. . .. ." Id.
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lation.29 ' CRS's were born in an era of regulation.
Smaller carriers did not fear the early development of
CRS's because they posed no real competitive threat.
Routes, fares, and competition in the industry were rela-
tively fixed. The number of offerings the public had to
choose from was small. Thus, the present role CRS's now
fill did not exist prior to deregulation.
Deregulation made CRS's the power they are. Only
with deregulation did CRS's develop into the crucial ele-
ment in commercial aviation that they have become. The
crux of the unfairness lies wholly in the switch from regu-
lation. CRS vendors became entrenched during regula-
tion; then they exploited their advantage afterwards. This
chain of events is not an example of a "better mouse-
trap ' 292 and CRS regulation is justified on this basis
alone. In addition, to the extent the present CRS regula-
tion is ineffective, stricter rules are needed and justified.
Free enterprise, in the form of fairer price competition,
will flourish, rather than suffer, by governmental regula-
tion of the CRS industry.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 2. In an opening statement by Senator Hillings, the Senator states his
view that " if someone builds a better mousetrap, let it be." Id. The Senator
continues by saying that there may, however, be a legitimate role for government
"intrusion." Id.
